Expressions “touches” or “touch” in first part of S. 7, and, “physical contact” in second part of S. 7, cannot be construed as “skin-to-skin” contact. The most important ingredient for constituting offence of “sexual assault” under S. 7 is “sexual intent” and not “skin-to-skin” contact. Crucially, neither S. 7 nor any other provision of the POCSO Act even remotely suggests that “direct” physical contact unimpeded by clothing is essential for an offence to be committed. Both direct and indirect contact with sexual intent, come within the umbrage of “sexual assault” as defined in S. 7. Furthermore, expression “assault” in S. 7 of the POCSO Act has a meaning entirely removed from the definition of “assault” in S. 351 IPC. Emphasis and intent of S. 7 is to address the felt social need of outlawing behaviour driven by sexual intent i.e. that the offending behaviour (whether by direct or indirect contact as explained above), should be motivated with sexual intent. The very object of enacting the POCSO Act is to protect children from sexual abuse. Hence, the key is the proscription of behaviour driven by sexual intent, and not the nature of the “touch” or “contact”. Hence, held, offence of “sexual assault” under S. 7 can be made out even in the absence of skin-to-skin contact. Restricting the interpretation of the words “touch” or “physical contact” to “skin-to-skin contact” would not only be a narrow and pedantic interpretation of the provision contained in S. 7 of the POCSO Act, but it would lead to an absurd interpretation of the said provision. The very object of enacting the POCSO Act is to protect the children from sexual abuse. If such a narrow interpretation is accepted, it would lead to a very detrimental situation, frustrating the very object of the Act, inasmuch as in that case, to give a few instances, touching the sexual or non-sexual parts of the body of a child with gloves, condoms, sheets or with cloth, though done with sexual intent would not amount to offence of sexual assault under S. 7 of the POCSO Act.
[Attorney General v. Satish, (2022) 5 SCC 545]